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255 
NOTES 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PANHANDLING ORDINANCES: 
MAKING “CENTS” OUT OF REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT 
Megan Smith* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past twenty-five years, cities have increasingly implemented 
“status” ordinances that aim to reduce the visibility of homelessness.1 Such 
laws make it illegal to sleep, sit or store personal belongings in public areas.2 
Other more facially neutral laws3—laws prohibiting open containers, 
loitering or disorderly conduct—have been disproportionately enforced 
against people who are homeless or living in poverty.4 Many cities have 
adopted a new approach to reduce the visibility of homelessness by creating 
legislation that makes it unlawful for any person on the street to panhandle.5 
Panhandling is broadly defined as asking another person for money or items 
of value.6 In 2014, more than three out of every four cities in the United States 
                                                                                                                           
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2017. 
1 A Dream Denied: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE 
HOMELESS (Jan. 2006), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/trends.html. 
2 NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 1. 
3 A “facially neutral” law is one that, as written, does not explicitly discriminate against a particular 
group. 
4 NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 1. 
5 See discussion infra Part D. See also NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 1 for a chart 
on cities that prohibit begging and aggressive panhandling. 
6 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/panhandle (last visited 
May 6, 2017). 
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had an ordinance prohibiting panhandling in certain public areas.7 Local 
business owners and associations interested in promoting safety and local 
tourism often support these efforts, while opponents of such laws argue that 
these restrictions serve to further criminalize homelessness and create 
additional barriers for people trying to move out of poverty.8 
This Note aims to examine the constitutionality of such panhandling 
ordinances in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert.9 Part II of this Note offers judicial background on 
panhandling as a form of charitable solicitation protected by the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech clause and reviews the level of judicial 
scrutiny applicable to freedom of speech claims. Part III discusses the 
disagreement among federal circuits as to whether panhandling restrictions 
are content-based and the support McCullen v. Coakley10 offers to those 
challenging panhandling restrictions. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert and speculates as to the effect this 
decision will have on aggressive panhandling laws in the future. 
II. PANHANDLING AS CHARITABLE SOLICITATION AND LEVELS OF JUDICIAL 
SCRUTINY IN FREEDOM OF SPEECH CLAIMS 
A. Charitable Solicitations: A Protected Form of Speech 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”11 
Freedom of speech is essential to the preservation of a free society in which 
government is based upon the consent of informed citizens and is dedicated 
to protecting the rights of all individuals.12 While the Supreme Court has yet 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 No Safe Place: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L L. CTR. ON 
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY 1, 20, https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place. 
8 NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 1. 
9 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
10 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
12 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring). 
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to decide on the constitutionality of panhandling restrictions directly, it has 
recognized charitable solicitation as a protected form of speech.13 
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, the Court 
held that an ordinance requiring a nonprofit environmental protection 
organization to use seventy-five percent of its revenue from charitable 
solicitations for charitable purposes was invalid because it was overbroad.14 
The governmental interest in protecting the public from fraud, crime and 
undue annoyance, while substantial, was “only peripherally promoted by the 
75 percent requirement and could be sufficiently served by measures less 
destructive of First Amendment interests.”15 The Court noted that solicitation 
activities are generally intertwined with informative and persuasive speech 
that seeks support for particular causes or views on economic, political or 
social issues.16 Thus, the Supreme Court found that “charitable appeals for 
funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests—
communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views 
and ideas, and the advocacy of causes—that are within the protection of the 
First Amendment.”17 Several circuit courts have since recognized 
panhandling as a type of solicitation protected by the First Amendment, 
finding little difference between those who solicit for charities and those who 
solicit on behalf of themselves.18 
B. Applicable Levels of Judicial Scrutiny 
With the recognition of charitable solicitation as a protected form of 
speech, courts must determine what level of judicial scrutiny to apply when 
examining the constitutionality of an ordinance restricting panhandling. 
Courts apply a more rigorous standard of review to regulations restricting 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 629 (1980); Riley v. Nat’l 
Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788–89 (1988); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 
725 (1990). 
14 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 632. 
18 Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 
899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000); Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013); Smith v. City of Ft. 
Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956–57 (11th Cir. 1999); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 
556 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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speech in areas where panhandling primarily occurs—public sidewalks, 
streets and parks, which are traditional public fora.19 This is because public 
fora “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public” and 
used for “purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions.”20 
The level of scrutiny applied also depends on whether the regulation of 
speech is content-based or content-neutral.21 Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid and are subject to strict scrutiny.22 Such laws may be 
justified only if the government proves that the regulation is the least 
restrictive means to serve a compelling government interest.23 The 
government, however, has somewhat wider leeway when enacting 
restrictions that are deemed content-neutral.24 Content-neutral restrictions are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny and are valid if they are narrowly tailored to 
restrict no more speech than necessary, serve a significant government 
interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.25 
III. CONFLICT AMONG CIRCUIT COURTS PRIOR TO REED 
A. Panhandling Ordinances as Content-Neutral v. Content-Based 
The determination of whether a panhandling law is content-neutral or 
content-based is critical to determining the constitutionality of that law, and 
prior to Reed, federal circuit courts were divided on how to make such a 
determination. For example, in American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Las 
Vegas, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found an ordinance banning 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2522 (2014) (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 
171, 180 (1983)). Restrictions in nonpublic fora need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not 
an effort to suppress the speaker’s message due to disagreement with the speaker’s viewpoint. Int’l Soc’y 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687 (1992). 
20 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Hague v. CIO, 
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
21 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011). 
22 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (“When the Government seeks 
to restrict speech based on its content, the usual presumption of constitutionality afforded congressional 
enactments is reversed.”). 
23 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92, 95 (1972); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
24 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529. 
25 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 804 (1989); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
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solicitation in downtown Las Vegas to be content-based because it prohibited 
a certain type of solicitation—begging for “the purpose of obtaining money, 
charity, business or patronage, or gifts or items of value for oneself or another 
person or organization.”26 As a content-based restriction, the ordinance did 
not survive strict scrutiny.27 Similarly, in Loper v. New York City Police 
Department, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that an ordinance 
prohibiting loitering in a public place for the purpose of begging was content-
based because it prohibited all speech related to begging.28 Likewise, in 
Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit found that a statute prohibiting solicitations could conceivably be 
content-based.29 There, the ordinance prohibited requests only for 
“immediate donations,” thereby permitting requests for future donations, and 
“plainly distinguish[ing] between types of solicitations on its face.”30 
However, the court held that “not every content distinction merits strict 
scrutiny; instead, a distinction is only content-based if it distinguishes content 
with a censorial intent to value some forms of speech over others . . . .”31 The 
court, unable to reach a conclusion regarding the censorial purpose, held that 
the district court erred in finding the ordinance content-neutral as a matter of 
law and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.32 
In contrast, in ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that the National Park Service’s panhandling law 
prohibiting “soliciting or demanding gifts, money, goods or services” in the 
area of the National Mall in Washington, D.C. was content-neutral and 
valid.33 The court held that because the regulation prohibited only in-person 
requests for immediate donations, rather than all requests for donations, it 
was a regulation on the manner in which the message was conveyed rather 
than on the content of the message.34 The court cited Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in ISKCON v. Lee, in which he stated that a regulation 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2006). 
27 Id. at 797. 
28 Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993). 
29 Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2013). 
30 Id. at 556. 
31 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
32 Id. 
33 ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
34 Id. at 955. 
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prohibiting in-person solicitation for immediate payment regulated the 
manner but not the content of the expression.35 
Several circuit courts of appeal have not yet reached a determination on 
whether similar ordinances are content-based restrictions. For example, in 
Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit allowed the panhandling ordinance on Fort Lauderdale’s beaches, 
finding that the prohibition was narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate 
interest in promoting tourism.36 However, the issue of whether the ordinance 
was content-based was never raised.37 More recently, in Speet v. Schuette, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Michigan statute criminalizing 
begging in public places violated the First Amendment because it was 
substantially overbroad.38 The court, however, never reached a formal 
determination on whether the restriction was content-based.39 In Los Angeles 
Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit deferred the question of whether a Los Angeles anti-solicitation 
ordinance was content-based to the California Supreme Court.40 In response 
to the certified question, the California Supreme Court found that a ban on 
all aggressive solicitation for immediate donations and a ban on all requests 
for immediate donations in certain captive audience areas should be 
considered content-neutral because such a regulation could be “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”41 Relying on Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, the court reasoned that literal content neutrality is 
not necessary for the regulation to be content-neutral, it is only required that 
the regulation be justified by legitimate governmental concerns unrelated to 
any “disagreement with the message conveyed.”42 
                                                                                                                           
 
35 Id. at 955 (citing ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 706 (1992)). 
36 Smith v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956–57 (11th Cir. 1999). 
37 Id. 
38 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013). 
39 Id. See also Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that although a 
“colorable argument” could be made that the challenged panhandling ordinance was content-based, the 
court need not decide that issue because the parties agreed that the regulation was content-neutral). 
40 L.A. All. for Survival v. City of L.A., 157 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1998). 
41 L.A. All. for Survival v. City of L.A., 22 Cal. 4th 352, 379 (Cal. 2000) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 485 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
42 Id. at 368 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
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B. McCullen Offers Guidance 
McCullen v. Coakley offered a new source of support to those 
challenging panhandling laws. In June 2014, the Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that statutorily required “buffer zones” around abortion 
clinics in Massachusetts violated the First Amendment.43 The law 
criminalized knowingly standing on a “public way or sidewalk” within thirty-
five feet of an entrance to any “reproductive health care facility.”44 Although 
the Court ultimately held the ordinance to be invalid,45 the Court found the 
ordinance to be content-neutral in part because it did not require enforcement 
authorities to examine the content of the speech within the buffer zone to 
determine whether a violation had occurred.46 One could violate the statute 
by merely standing within the buffer zone without uttering a word.47 Thus, 
the Court suggested that the determination of whether a restriction is content-
neutral is not simply based on whether the law can be justified without 
reference to the speech.48 This is significant because most panhandling 
ordinances have provisions that operate like buffer zones—prohibiting 
panhandling within a certain distance of ATMs, restaurants, bus stops and 
other locations.49 However, unlike the buffer zone in McCullen, most 
panhandling ordinances permit individuals to speak within these so-called 
buffer zones, even request signatures or future donations, without violating 
the ordinance.50 The ordinances are violated only if the speech within the 
buffer zone is an immediate request for money or an item of value, which 
requires enforcement authorities to listen to the content of the speech to 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014). 
44 Id. at 2541. 
45 The Court found that the buffer zone was not narrowly tailored, and thus burdened more speech 
than necessary to achieve the government’s legitimate interest in public safety, patient access to healthcare 
and unobstructed use of public sidewalks and roadways. In failing to use a more targeted means to address 
the issue, the statute unnecessarily applied to nonviolent individuals and their speech and burdened their 
ability to initiate one-on-one communications with patients entering the clinic. Id. at 2535–38. 
46 Id. at 2531 (citing Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 
377 (1984)). 
47 Id. 
48 See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2523 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
49 NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 1. 
50 See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
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determine whether a violation has occurred. This is precisely the kind of law 
that the Court in McCullen described as content-based.51 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT ON PANHANDLING 
ORDINANCES 
A. Reed v. Town of Gilbert 
Even after McCullen, the principle inquiry in determining content 
neutrality remained whether the government adopted the regulation because 
of its disagreement with the message conveyed.52 Courts looked to the 
government’s motivation for enacting the regulation and deemed the 
regulation content-neutral if it served a purpose unrelated to the content of 
expression.53 However, Reed v. Gilbert offers a different approach to 
determining content neutrality, which will significantly impact how courts 
analyze the constitutionality of panhandling ordinances in the future. 
In Reed, the Supreme Court held that an ordinance imposing restrictions 
on outdoor signs based on the information the sign conveyed was a content-
based regulation that failed to survive strict scrutiny.54 Under the ordinance, 
outdoor signs posted for public display—temporary event signs, political 
signs and ideological signs—were each subject to different display time 
limits and size restrictions.55 Greater restrictions were imposed on the 
plaintiff’s temporary directional signs, directing the public to a church, than 
on campaign signs or signs conveying other messages.56 
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, which had upheld the 
ordinance.57 Relying on Hill v. Colorado,58 the Ninth Circuit had found the 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 383, 377). 
52 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
53 Id. 
54 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 2223–26. 
57 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 
2218 (2015). 
58 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–20 (2000) (finding that a Colorado statute imposing a buffer 
zone around unwilling listeners within 100 feet of a health care facility was content-neutral because: 
(1) the statute was not adopted because of disagreement with the message conveyed, it applied equally to 
all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint; and (2) the State’s interests were unrelated to the content of 
the speech). 
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ordinance to be content-neutral because the town did not adopt the regulation 
because of disagreement with the signs’ messages, and the town’s interest in 
preserving aesthetics and traffic safety were unrelated to the content of the 
signs.59 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the sign regulation was 
content-based on its face, and thus determined it was not necessary to 
consider the town’s justifications for the sign restriction.60 In the majority 
opinion, Justice Thomas wrote, “[a] law that is content based on its face is 
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, 
content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas contained in 
the regulated speech.”61 The Court then determined that giving one type of 
sign, whether ideological, political or direction, more favorable treatment 
than another was a “paradigmatic example” of content-based 
discrimination.62 
While the opinion in Reed did not address panhandling restrictions, its 
effect on such laws are significant. Reed clarified that the initial content-
based inquiry is “whether a regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws 
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.”63 Accordingly, a law 
regulating speech should first be evaluated on its face to determine if it 
applies to particular speech because of the message expressed.64 If it does, 
the law is deemed to be content-based, without an inquiry into the law’s 
purpose.65 Therefore, a speech restriction targeted at a specific subject matter 
is content-based regardless of the content-neutral justification for the law.66 
This approach to determining content neutrality presents a significant 
challenge to defenders of panhandling ordinances. The implications are 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 Reed, 707 F.3d at 1071. 
60 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 
61 Id. (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
62 Id. Finding the law to be content-based, the court held that the sign ordinance failed to survive 
strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s purported interests in 
preserving aesthetic appeal and traffic safety. Id. at 2231–32. More specifically, the town failed to show 
how limiting the number, size, and display duration of directional signs, while allowing larger ideological 
or political signs to be displayed for a longer period of time, was necessary to preserve the aesthetics of 
the town or traffic safety. Id. 
63 Id. at 2227. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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evident in two recent circuit court rulings: Norton v. Springfield67 and Thayer 
v. City of Worcester.68 
B. Norton v. City of Springfield 
Norton v. City of Springfield was the first federal circuit court decision 
to interpret Reed in the panhandling context.69 Two months after the 
McCullen decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Norton, upheld a City of 
Springfield ordinance that prohibited panhandling in the city’s downtown 
historic district.70 Under the ordinance, immediate oral requests for money 
were prohibited, but written requests or requests for future donations were 
permitted.71 In analyzing whether a regulation was content-based, the court 
only considered two factors—whether the city regulated the targeted speech 
because of the ideas it conveys and whether the city regulated the speech 
because it disapproved of its message.72 The court ruled that the ordinance 
was a valid content-neutral restriction.73 Shortly after the decision in Reed, 
however, the Seventh Circuit granted a rehearing of Norton to apply the 
analysis from Reed.74 
In its decision on rehearing, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme 
Court changed how content discrimination is to be understood when it opined 
in Reed that, “regulation of speech is content-based if a law applies to 
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed.”75 The court found that Reed abolishes a distinction between 
content regulation and subject-matter regulation, meaning that “any law 
distinguishing one kind of speech from another by reference to its meaning 
now requires a compelling justification.”76 Under this analysis, the court 
found that the Springfield ordinance was content-based because it regulated 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015). 
68 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 233 (D. Mass. 2015). 
69 Norton, 806 F.3d at 411. 
70 Norton v. Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g, No. 15-3276, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 162705, at *1, *2 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2015). 
71 Id. at 714. 
72 Id. at 717. 
73 Id. 
74 See Norton, 806 F.3d at 411. 
75 Id. at 412 (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227) (emphasis in original). 
76 Id. 
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speech based on the topic discussed.77 As such, the restriction required a 
compelling justification and the city could not meet that burden.78 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in the rehearing of Norton, 
Springfield adopted a new panhandling ordinance which made it unlawful 
for any individual to ask pedestrians for “an immediate donation of money 
or other gratuity,” while “knowingly approaching within five feet” of the 
individual.79 The city argued that this ordinance regulates activity, not 
speech.80 In December 2015, an Illinois District Court held that Springfield’s 
revised panhandling ordinance was still a content-based restriction.81 The 
court noted that: 
[Individuals] can ask for the time, talk about the weather, ask someone to sign a 
petition, or even solicit support (either nonmonetary support or for a future 
contribution) for causes or organizations while approaching within five feet of the 
person being addressed. However, [they] are not permitted to ask pedestrians for 
“an immediate donation of money or other gratuity” while “knowingly 
approaching within five feet” of the individual.82 
Therefore, because the ordinance prohibited one type of speech, while 
allowing other types, the court held that the ordinance was content-based and 
failed to survive strict scrutiny.83 
C. Thayer v. City of Worcester 
In Thayer v. City of Worcester, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
a City of Worcester ordinance prohibiting immediate requests for donations 
within twenty feet of various public locations, including bus stops and 
restaurants.84 The court stated that the principal inquiry for determining 
whether a regulation of speech is content-based is whether the government 
adopted the regulation because it disagreed with the message certain speech 
                                                                                                                           
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 413. 
79 Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 15-3276, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162705, at *1, *2 (C.D. Ill. 
Dec. 4, 2015). 
80 Id. at *4. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at *4–5. 
83 Id. at *6. 
84 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 64–71 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
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conveys.85 The court found that even though the ban applied only to 
“immediate” donations, that distinction alone does not render the ordinance 
content-based as long as the distinction is justified by a legitimate, non-
censorial motive.86 Finding the ordinance to be content-neutral, the court 
found that the appellants failed to make the prima facie showing necessary 
to trigger the government’s burden of proving that the ordinance survives 
intermediate scrutiny, and the restriction was therefore valid.87 
In June 2015, nearly two weeks after deciding Reed, the Supreme Court 
granted Thayer’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the First Circuit’s 
upholding of the panhandling ordinance, and remanded the case “for further 
consideration in light of [Reed].”88 On remand, the district court, relying on 
Reed, ruled that a law may be content-based on its face regardless of whether 
the legislature’s purpose or justification for enacting the law was content-
neutral.89 Accordingly, the court held that “Reed mandates a finding that [the 
ordinance] is content based because it targets anyone seeking to engage in a 
specific type of speech, i.e., solicitation of donations.”90 
The court then applied the reasoning from two post-Reed decisions that 
analyzed nearly identical panhandling ordinances as those at issue in 
Thayer—McLaughlin v. City of Lowell and Browne v. City of Grand 
Junction.91 As in McLaughlin and Browne, the court found that the 
panhandling ordinances at issue failed to survive strict scrutiny because they 
were not the least restrictive means of achieving the governments’ purported 
interests in promoting safety and were duplicative of existing criminal laws.92 
In particular, the court found that there was no justification for the city’s 
determination that banning solicitations within twenty feet of ATMs and 
various other facilities, rather than a smaller distance, was the least restrictive 
means available to protect the public.93 The court further found that the city’s 
temporal solicitation ban which prohibited soliciting any person in public 
                                                                                                                           
 
85 Id. at 67. 
86 Id. at 69. 
87 Id. at 73. 
88 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
89 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 233 (D. Mass. 2015) (emphasis in original). 
90 Id. at 233 n.2. 
91 Id. at 236–37. See McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177 (D. Mass. 2015); Browne 
v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276 (D. Colo. 2015). 
92 Thayer, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 236–37. See McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d; Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d. 
93 Id. at 237. 
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after dark was invalid because “the City ha[d] not cited to any evidence or 
provided any meaningful argument to establish that a ‘blanket prohibition on 
panhandling at night [wa]s necessary to advance public safety.’”94  
D. Aggressive Panhandling Laws 
As seen in Thayer, local governments attempting to avoid constitutional 
challenges to their anti-panhandling laws have enacted aggressive 
panhandling laws. These laws attempt to narrow the scope of panhandling 
restrictions by banning panhandling involving coercive conduct or menacing 
acts.95 However, many “aggressive” panhandling laws include blanket 
prohibitions on solicitations during certain times and near certain locations, 
regardless of if the conduct associated with the panhandling is aggressive.96 
For example, Nashville’s aggressive panhandling ordinance makes it 
unlawful for any person to panhandle at a bus stop, sidewalk café, within 
twenty-five feet of an ATM facility and within ten feet of an entrance to any 
building open to the public, including commercial establishments.97 New 
Orleans’ aggressive panhandling ordinance prohibits panhandling in certain 
locations within its Downtown Development District, including in public 
parks and within thirty feet of cafés.98 In addition to prohibiting “aggressive” 
panhandling, Atlanta’s ordinance restricts panhandling within fifteen feet of 
the entrance or exit of any building, whether publicly or privately owned as 
well as within fifteen feet of any parking pay station, pay telephone, public 
toilet and ATM facility.99 It also creates “Restricted Monetary Solicitation 
Zones,” which restrict panhandling in the city’s most populated streets.100 
Similarly, Orlando makes it unlawful to panhandle in public parks, 
fairgrounds, sporting facilities and on public property in the Downtown Core 
District,101 and Pittsburgh prohibits panhandling in various “captive audience 
areas,” including within twenty-five feet of a line of people waiting to gain 
                                                                                                                           
 
94 Id. at 235 (quoting Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1292–93). 
95 See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 1. 
96 See id. 
97 NASHVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.12.090 (2008). 
98 NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 54-412 (2016). 
99 ATLANTA, GA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 106-85 (2016). 
100 Id. 
101 ORLANDO, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 43.86(2) (2002). 
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admission to a place and within twenty-five feet of the entrance to a place of 
religious assembly.102 
Additionally, panhandling ordinances frequently make it illegal to 
panhandle in groups of two or more or to repeat the request after the person 
solicited gives a negative response.103 Many local governments also have 
blanket prohibitions against panhandling after dark.104 New Orleans, for 
example, makes it unlawful to engage in panhandling after 7:00 p.m. or 
before 6:00 a.m.105 These types of ordinances—prohibiting panhandling at 
night or within high traffic areas—restrict peaceful solicitations and limit 
panhandling in areas where solicitation is most likely to be profitable. They 
also aim to restrict a particular type of solicitation—oral requests for 
immediate donations of money or items of value. Such ordinances do not 
criminalize other kinds of solicitation such as requests for future donations, 
signatures or offers to sell goods or services. Reed mandates that laws aimed 
at targeting individuals engaged in a specific type of speech are content-based 
and subject to strict scrutiny. In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, the law must 
be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government 
interest.106 
Courts will likely refuse to recognize that blanket time and place 
prohibitions within aggressive panhandling ordinances are the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. Local 
governments may argue that banning panhandling at night or within a certain 
distance of an ATM is necessary to prevent listeners from feeling 
uncomfortable or intimidated.107 However, concern for listeners’ discomfort 
is not a sufficient justification to restrict speech.108 And while promoting 
                                                                                                                           
 
102 PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 602.04(a)(1) (2014). 
103 See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 106-85(b) (2015). 
104 See NASHVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.12.090(C) (2008); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE 
OF ORDINANCES, § 602.03(a) (2013). 
105 NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 54-412 (2016). 
106 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)). 
107 Editorial, A Monkey Wrench in Cities’ Panhandling Laws, DENVER POST, Oct. 2, 2015, http:// 
www.denverpost.com/editorials/ci_28913262/monkey-wrench-cities-panhandling-laws. 
108 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2532. 
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safety on public sidewalks and streets is a legitimate government interest,109 
as discussed in Thayer and Browne, there is no evidence that panhandling at 
night is inherently dangerous or threatening to the public.110 Similarly, there 
is no indication that public safety is threatened simply because the person 
doing the solicitation had made another request after an initial request was 
refused, or was standing a certain distance away from an ATM, or was with 
a friend.111 Therefore, ordinances will fail under strict scrutiny, unless local 
governments can particularize why their panhandling provisions are the least 
restrictive means of addressing public safety.112 Such a task will be 
challenging as most of the conduct that aggressive panhandling laws aim to 
prohibit is sufficiently regulated through pre-existing laws that address 
threats to public safety directly.113 Ordinances that prohibit stopping a 
vehicle, obstructing streets and sidewalks, and engaging in assault and 
battery could all be applied to the conduct aggressive panhandling ordinances 
are intending to address.114 Therefore, local governments can advance public 
safety by enacting and enforcing laws narrowly tailored to address coercive 
and harassing conduct, without restricting innocent speech.115 With these less 
restrictive means of addressing public safety available, courts will likely find 
many panhandling restrictions burden more speech than necessary and thus 
are constitutionally invalid. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, courts are likely to strike down anti-
panhandling laws as constitutionally invalid, content-based restrictions, as 
they treat requests for immediate donations less favorably than other types of 
solicitation, drawing the distinction based on the content of the message the 
speaker conveys. Non-enforcement of existing panhandling laws is not a 
                                                                                                                           
 
109 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network, 519 U.S. 357, 375 (1997); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
650 (1981). 
110 Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292 (D. Colo. 2015); Thayer v. City 
of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235 (D. Mass. 2015). 
111 Thayer, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 236. 
112 See Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1292. 
113 Thayer, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 223. 
114 Id. at 223–24. 
115 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2014). 
270 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 35:255 
 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.123 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
sufficient remedy because it will leave many individuals unsure of their 
rights, leading them to simply abstain from constitutionally protected speech, 
which not only harms those seeking to solicit donations, but also deprives 
society of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.116 Therefore, local 
governments should modify their panhandling laws to restrict only that 
conduct which constitutes a threat to public safety. When local governments 
create laws to protect public safety, they must ensure those laws do not 
infringe upon First Amendment rights. The current trend, post-Reed, of 
invalidating laws that impose greater restrictions on panhandling than on 
other forms of speech will likely continue. Moving forward, perhaps this 
trend will encourage more efforts to address the issue of homelessness and 
poverty directly, rather than simply trying to reduce its visibility. 
                                                                                                                           
 
116 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003). 
